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Lock, Stock and Icebergs sets a new standard for Cana-
dian Arctic policy studies. Not everyone in this country 
will agree with or be pleased by what the author has to say. 
But every one of us who is interested in the Arctic stands to 
gain by coming to terms with his take on a theme that’s in 
danger of becoming stale. And if somehow a good number 
of us were to become critically aware of the information, 
perspectives, and insights that are on offer here, the quality 
of Canadian public debate about the Arctic would improve, 
perhaps greatly. All along, the rigour and ease displayed 
by Adam Lajeunesse in delving into the governmental side 
of Canadian Arctic policy-making are a challenge to those 
who would do the same.
Lajeunesse’s study is a detailed history of the evolution 
of Canadian policy-making and policy for the governance 
of the Arctic waters that we regarded as our own during the 
century from the transfer of authority from Great Britain in 
1880 to the Canada-U.S. Arctic Cooperation Agreement of 
1988. It is also a history of managed Canada-U.S. disagree-
ment as experienced and handled by the Canadian side. 
Lock, Stock and Icebergs reports great consistency 
and gradual (but nevertheless substantial) success in the 
Canadian effort to gain U.S. acquiescence in and assent 
to Canadian rights to exercise jurisdiction, and therefore 
a measure of control, over foreign commercial and other 
private navigation in and about the waters of the Arctic 
Archipelago. The story told of U.S. naval operations in 
those same waters is something else. Given a century of 
constancy in Canada’s overall approach to its Arctic waters 
and in the absence of any substantial change in Canada’s 
outward behaviour on Arctic maritime issues since 1988, 
the account presented here is very apropos today. 
The narrative is constructed around three themes. They 
are examined together to yield an integrated assessment 
of Arctic sovereignty policy development as it took place. 
The first theme concerns just what lands and waters 
Canada would claim sovereignty over in a frontier region 
of incrementally (and then, with World War II and the Cold 
War, rapidly) increasing activity and interest for a perennial 
group of southern Canadian policy makers residing in 
Ottawa. In the course of many decades, priority came to be 
given to the maritime over the terrestrial in their thinking 
about a claim, and to the concept not of a Canadian Arctic 
sector, but of historic internal waters delimited by straight 
baselines drawn from headland to headland around the 
Archipelago. With skill and ingenuity that are well depicted 
here, Canadian policy makers saw to it that there was no 
challenge when the claim was at last made in 1985. 
Lajeunesse’s second theme is the evolution of a basis 
for the Canadian claim in international law and in the 
320 • REVIEWS
international affairs of the day. The issue here was, and still 
is, the creation of facts and arguments that would convince 
the world to treat Canada’s Arctic waters as internal, and 
not, as urged by the United States and most other maritime 
nations, as an international strait with rights of transit pas-
sage by foreign vessels, both state and private, as specified 
by the Law of the Sea. Canada’s unilateral declaration of 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, made in l970 
without effective international opposition, stands out in 
the account given here, only to be dwarfed by the brilliant 
diplomatic achievement of driving the negotiation of Arti-
cle 234 of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and its 
recognition of the right of coastal states to regulate com-
mercial and other private navigation in ice-covered waters. 
As occurred with the specification of Canada’s claim of 
sovereignty, the goal of step-by-step or “fibre by fibre” suc-
cess in gaining international acceptance was pursued with 
impressive creativity and is rightly praised in the book. 
Adroit as Canadian policy makers were in articulating 
and advancing a sovereignty claim in the face of U.S. and 
wider international opposition, something had to be granted 
to the United States. This brings us to the third theme of 
the book: What was Canada prepared to do, physically as 
well as diplomatically, to further its Arctic maritime sover-
eignty? Having already touched on some of the diplomatic 
process, this reviewer needs to turn to the physical issues 
and question not Lajeunesse’s findings, but what he makes 
of them. 
The book’s preface opens with the assertion that for 
more than 100 years the Canadian government’s pub-
lic stance on the Arctic has differed from the “more prag-
matic” approach taken in its dealings with U.S. officials 
in private. For Lajeunesse, anything else would have been 
“truly shocking.” For me, what’s somewhat shocking and 
no real surprise is the continuous practice of a democratic 
government in being more open and accommodating with 
its principal adversary than it is in its reports to its own 
people on an issue of proven concern to them. 
In their striving for sovereignty, Canadian policy mak-
ers have done more than achieve substantial advances in 
our ability to control foreign private entry into and activ-
ity in the Archipelago. As I read Lajeunesse, they have also 
found it necessary and indeed desirable to allow the U.S. 
Navy to operate in Canada’s many northwest-southeast and 
east-west Arctic waterways as though they were governed 
by the international straits regime, as the United States has 
insisted. Accompanied by references to notification, con-
currence, and permission elsewhere in the book, the evi-
dence of de facto U.S. freedom of naval action is laid out 
most clearly in chapter 10, which deals with previously 
classified U.S. submarine activity in transiting and explor-
ing these waterways, as well as helping Canada to estab-
lish submarine sensing capabilities at choke points in the 
Archipelago.
The problem here is not the underwater activities of the 
United States in Canada. In my opinion, they have been 
allowable both as allied naval security operations and for 
their contribution to U.S. readiness to endorse a growing 
measure of sovereign Canadian control over foreign pri-
vate navigation in Canadian waters. It is that the Canadian 
government acted without also revealing and explaining, 
choosing to remain unaccountable to an uninformed pub-
lic. For this is a public that’s historically prone to explode in 
true-north outrage on learning of U.S. activity in the Arctic 
Archipelago, in outrage that’s been promoted by politicians 
who should know better. 
As I write these words, the luxury U.S. cruise ship 
Crystal Serenity is preparing to take the Northwest Pas-
sage from Anchorage to New York in August and Septem-
ber with more than 1000 passengers, 600 crew, and a hull 
that’s thin and not strengthened to resist ice. Serenity’s voy-
age is therefore being very closely monitored and controlled 
by Transport Canada, in conjunction with other Canadian 
government departments, U.S. agencies, and the Govern-
ment of Nunavut, together with hunter and trapper associa-
tions in small Inuit communities along the route. I expect 
the voyage could well be a success and the first of a series 
of extravagant cruise-ship transits. But Serenity also acts as 
early surrogate for a U.S. aircraft carrier and accompany-
ing strike force of high-value, thin-skinned ships, as well as 
attack submarines, all in a convoy needing to make a rapid 
inter-ocean transfer of naval assets between the Pacific and 
the North Atlantic in a U.S.-Russia clash over one or more 
of the Baltic states, or in a crisis with China over Taiwan. If 
the Crystal Serenity can do it, so can an entire carrier-based 
strike force when the conditions are right and the necessity 
arises. 
Canadians need to become capable of intelligent con-
versation about such things before they happen. Indigenous 
peoples, Inuit foremost, need to be made part of a conver-
sation that Lajeunesse inadvertently shows to have been 
conducted almost entirely without them. The office-holding 
politicians and the officials of Canada need to ease up on 
the information control. They also need to stop simultane-
ously feeding and fearing live Canadian opinion on Arctic 
sovereignty, when what we should be talking about is coop-
erative stewardship and security. Those of us in the atten-
tive public need to factor the findings of Lock, Stock and 
Icebergs into new consensual knowledge that helps us all to 
shape, as well as understand, what’s in store for the Arctic 
Archipelago in the fast-moving 21st century. 
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